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The reorientation of theology along what may be called
'realistic' lines which came shortly after World War I on
Continental Europe, and a few years later in the United States,
has come as a result of events which shook the world, but it
is likewise greatly indebted to the influence of strong men.
Paul Tillich came to the United States in 1933, after having
participated actively in the process of theological levelling on
the Continent. Between 1918 and 1933 Tillich was both a
colleague and a critic of Karl Barth, as the latter led in the
movement which shifted the total emphasis of Continental
theology. The Crisis Theology shook the foundations of the
liberalism which identified the Kingdom of God with human
progress, eternity with time, God with resident forces of
nature, and Revelation with the processes of human reason.
It asserted again the reality of the divine transcendence, the
sinfulness of man, the otherness of Revelation from reason
and the dignity of Christ as Lord.
In the theology of the post-Crisis theological period, it has
been Tillich who has pioneered in offering a re-evaluation of
the doctrine of man�a doctrine which was sometimes lost in
the shuffle in which Barth, Brunner and Gogarten were engaged.
It must be remembered, of course, that Tillich worked closely
with Reinhold Niebuhr, particularly in his early years in
America. He is no doubt indebted to the doughty warrior from
Missouri in the development of a newer and more realistic
doctrine of man.
In his approach to the question of human nature , Tillich re
minds us that man is not an easy creature to know.
^ He does
not detain himself long with the consideration of the origin of
man's basic physical structure; it seems quite clear that he
accepts the view that man's physical organism is the product
of long eons of evolution, which history he is willing to leave
Systematic Theology , I, p. 169.
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to the anthropologists. Says he, "Historical man is a descend
ant of beings who had no history. "^ He does throw out one
warning at this point: while the sciences may study man as
they wish, they will not really know man through the means of
an objective and detached study. A proper understanding of
human nature will, he reminds us, come only to the one who
recognizes that man's nature is constantly changing in the
course of history; and hence that one may reachan inner under
standing of human nature only as he studies man in terms of a
self-identification with man's human and personal concerns.
In the proper understanding of man, the philosophers and
medical men must join with the theologian.^
It is almost correct to say that Tillich is more interested in
an analysis of human existence than he is in the analysis of
human nature. Actually he does at times reject belief in "an
unchangeable structure called human nature."'^ It may be
said, that Tillich's analysis of human nature may be under
stood in terms of two elements, (1) the ontological problem;
and (2) the existential predicament. It is to this two -fold study
of the problem that we now turn.
Tillich has sought to restore contact between contemporary
theology and the classic tradition in Western philosophy in his
deep concern with the question of being. At no point is his de
parture from the idealistic tradition of conventional theological
liberalism more evident than here . And while he is frequently
classified as an existentialist, he is nevertheless in radical
disagreement with the Kantian dualism at the point of its re
jection of ontology.
This article would run far beyond its length if it attempted
to discuss Tillich's analysis of "reality as a whole. It is
well to point out, that Tillich does feel that one part of the
work of the philosopher is that of seeking "to maintain a de
tached objectivity toward being and its structures..."^ It
goes without saying, that the theologian must pass rather
quickly beyond this to the understanding of the existential in-
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volvement of man. Tillich does, however, defend an onto
logical doctrine of man, in terms of the existence of some
thing in man which may be isolated for the purposes of study.
In other words, he makes a place for some objective or neutral
structure in man which exists in tension with the existential
factors which enter into his experience. But the 'self is not
such merely as a static entity; says Tillich, "Reason makes
the self a self, namely, a centered structure. . .
From much that Tillich has to say concerning man, one
gathers that he believes that finite existence has meaning
chiefly in its opposition to what may be called essential being.
But he does discuss man's 'essential' being, at least for
formal purposes. To him, 'essence' is to be defined in two
ways: first as "the nature of a thing, or the quality in which a
thing participates, or as a universal" and second, "as that
thing from which being has 'fallen, ' the true and undistorted
nature of things..."^ Man as he now exists is, of course,
separated from his undistorted nature; at the same time, he
does maintain (or retain) a relationship to the ontological
structures of the universe. True, in the Fall (which Tillich
interprets mythologically) man is held to have left his place of
identity with "the creative ground of the divine life" in order
to "stand upon" himself "to actualize what he essentially
is..."^ One asks, then, "Is man, in his state of severance
from his essence beyond any effective contact with the world
which ontology seeks to explore?"
Tillich's answer would be. No. Rather, at every point which
is crucial for human existence, essential and existential
factors exist in polarity. The essential elements enter into
every one of the features of the existential predicament. They
enter as well into the very structure of man's being, even
though no entirely objective interpretation of human nature is
possible.
To Tillich, philosophy is basically ontological; and theology
cannot avoid the basic question of philosophy, since "God is
the answer to the question implied in being. "-'^O More spe
cifically, the question of ontology must always be. What is
being itself? And applied to anthropology, it is raised in
form, What is that which can be said to be in man, apart from
' Ihid.
, I, p. 172.
^ Ihid. , I, p. 203.
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the group of human beings ?
To answer this, one must refer to Tillich's four levels of
ontological concepts,
(1) the basic ontological structure which is the im
plicit condition of the ontological question; (2) the
elements which constitute the ontological structure;
(3) the characteristics of being which are the con
ditions of existence; and (4) the categories of being
and knowing. 11
It is the third and fourth levels which concern us here. Tillich
rejects, of course, anything like Hegel's essentialism, and
asserts that man's present (i.e., existential) situation is one
of estrangement from his essential nature. �'�2 To exist is "to
stand out"�and Tillich insists that human existence is not a
mere standing-out of absolute non-being, but a standing-out of
1
relative non-being, or of "mere potentiality."
But, we ask, what is the essential level which he attaches to
man, the level which embraces "the characteristics of being
which are the conditions of existence" at his finite level? It is
difficult to discover his answer to this query . He asserts that
Hegel's essentialism is an attempt to conceal man's true
state. -'�^ He associates a true understanding of the 'essence
of humanity' with his analysis of what he calls "the myth of
the Fall," suggesting that man's ontological nature may be
located by some process of demythologization of this 'myth. '
Now, Tillich holds that man "belongs" to infinity: proof of
this is found, he thinks, in man's possession of freedom.
"Man is free, in so far as he can receive unconditional moral
and logical imperatives which indicate that he can transcend
the conditions which determine every finite being. "1^ In other
words, man possesses the power of transcending his environ
ment, not merely by virtue of being the highest finite level in
the ontological structure, but because he himself "asks the
ontological question, and in whose self-awareness the onto
logical answer can be found. "�'^^
Thus, seen ontologically , man experiences himself as be
longing to a world which he nevertheless transcends. He is
an ego which has, through the exercise of freedom, developed
^'^Ihid. , I, p. 164, ^"^Ibid. , H, p. 25.
^^Ihid , n, p, 25. ^^Ibid. , U, p. 31.
^^Ibid. , n, p. 20. ^^Ibid. , I, p. 168,
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a self. The world is to him a correlative concept, for he has
a world, and does not merely live in a world. �'^^ His relation
to the fourth level of ontology, namely to "the categories of
being and knowing""^^ is seen in these terms. He transcends
his world by taking his place as its "perspective-center"; he
expresses this transcendence by the employment of language,
especially abstract language. In viewing his world, he is
self-conscious of his ontic relation to it�that is, he sees
himself as a part of it, and as one who can break out of the
stimulis-response arc.
In summing up what Tillich finds of essential man through
the process of ontological analysis, we must note that he con
tends that "the essential nature of man is present in all stages
of his development. " Expressed dogmatically , says he, it has
been projected into the past "as a history before history," in
which he "dreams" himself as existing in a state of "innocent"
essential being. -^^ Here we find, of course, the radical dif
ference between his theology and that of historic Christianity .
He views man's unfallen state as a merely theoretical one,
couched in terms of myth. Rather than seeing human nature,
as it came from the Creative Hand, as perfect and bearing the
essence of true humanity, he accepts evil as a consequence of
actualized potentiality, as an essential concomitant of human-
ness. Sin becomes thus an inevitable consequence of the
actualization of finite freedom, while innocence is merely a
state imagined as the result of a process of idealization. The
account of the Fall becomes thus, not a record of something
which occurred, but a symbolic gesture upon the part of man,
signifying the tendency of 'dreaming innocence' to protect and
preserve itself. 20
Human Nature and the Existential Predicament
It has been noted2^ that at every point which is crucial for
human existence, there are polarities between essential and
existential elements. There is no 'orthodox' list of these po
larities to be found in Tillich's writings, but five of them do
appear regularly in his analysis of man's predicament as an
Ihid. , I, p. 170.
^^ Ihid. , H, p. 35.
Ibid. , I, p. 164. ^^Page 20 , this paper.
Ibid. , TI, p. 33.
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existing being. They are: The Infinite and finitude, Revelation
and human reason, Redemption and human sinfulness, destiny
and human freedom, and Courage (or self-affirmation) and
anxiety .
In his relation to the Infinite, man exercises "infinite self-
transcendence," so thatalthough he is finite, "nothing finite can
hold him. "22 Man is never satisfied with his finiteness. The
categories in terms of which bethinks evidence his finiteness�
time, space, causality and substance. The very utilization of
these bring him to a constant and poignant feeling of his
finiteness and insecurity.
In his relation to the polarity of Revelation and human
reason, Tillich holds that again man finds himself in tension.
He begins his consideration of the question of Revelation with
what he calls "pure phenomenology, " that is, by attempting to
describe meanings apart from the realities to which they
refer. But such a critical phenomenology does not sustain
itself long, for Revelation reveals the essentially mysterious,
and this does not lose its mysteriousnessby being made known.
Thus, Revelation is seen by Tillich to be always "a subjective
and an objective event in strict interdependence . "24 Sub
jectively, it implies what he calls 'ecstasy, 'by whichhemeans,
a state of mind "which is extraordinary in the sense that (it)
transcends its ordinary situation. "25 This connotes a situation
in which the mind seeks to transcend the subject-object
structure which is a factor in every knowing situation . Thus ,
in the 'ecstatic' situation, "Reason reaches its boundary line,
is thrown back upon itself, and then is driven to its extreme
situation. "26 This leads to what Tillich calls 'ontological
shock'; in it, the mysterium tremendum and the mysterium
fascinans meet.
Revelation is thus received in an ecstatic state of mind�a
state inwhich the rational structure of the mind is not destroyed ,
but merely for the moment set aside. Nothing is added to "the
complexof knowledgewhich is determined by the subject-object
structure of reason." Rather, Revelation adds 'dimension' to
those aspects of our knowingwhich has to do with "our ultimate
concern and to the mystery of being. "27
Systematic Theology , I, p. 191. Ihid. , I, p. 112.
Ibid. , I, pp. 106f. ^7^^^^- ' I' P- 113.
Ibid. , I, p. 111. ^^Ibid. , I, p. 115.
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It is at this point that Tillich's divergence from the position
of historic Christianity evidences itself most clearly- He re
jects that which may properly be termed the prepositional con
tent of doctrine. To him, Revelation is "independent of what
science and history say about the conditions in which it ap
pears"28 and occurs at a different dimension of reality. Thus,
reason "receives revelation in ecstasy and miracles" but
cannot be expected to apply any of its ordinary norms (as em
ployed for example in questions of scientific inquiry) to its
content. 29 Rather, says Tillich, reason must recognize that
"the word as a medium of revelation is not information" and
that "the 'Word of God' contains neither revealed command
ments nor revealed doctrines . "^0
Concerning the polarity involved in the relation between
Redemption and human sinfulness, Tillich is imclear at the
point of his understanding of the nature of sin. He sees the
Fall as basically a situation in which the unindividuated passes
to the individuated and the differentiated; and it is difficult to
see how this differs from Creation. Thus, the actualization of
finiteness leads to inevitable sinfulness, ^i As the individual
goes beyond 'innocence, ' he enters inevitably "into the sphere
of conflicts and of moral distinctions where one becomes sinful
and guilty . "32
Tillich's doctrine of Redemption is involved, and cannot be
considered in detail here . It centers in his belief that those
who participate in Christ come to share what he calls "the New
Being." Such a sharing involves "The three-fold ' re^ namely,
-conciliation, -union, -surrection. "33 Christ has
manifested "a personal life which is subjected to all the con
sequences of existential estrangement but wherein estrange
ment is conquered in himself and a permanent unity is kept with
God."^'^ For Tillich's understanding of precisely how men
participate in Christ, and of precisely this means to their
"^^Ibid. , I, p. 183.
^^Ibid. , I, p. 118.
rbid. , I, pp. I24f.
^^Ibid. , II, pp. 35ff.
Charles Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, The Theology of Paul
Tillich , p. 126.
^^Paul Tillich, The New Being, p. 20.
Systematic Theology , II, p. 135.
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personal lives, we must await Volume in of his ^Systematic
Theology .
To Tillich, destiny and human freedom likewise stand in
polarity. He sees freedom, not as a faculty of some aspect
of human nature (e.g. , the will); it is a quality "of man, that
is, of that being who is not a thing but a complete self and a
rational person.
"^^ It occurs only "in polar interdependence
with destiny"36 and enables men to exercise deliberation,
decision and responsibility . 37 He is not primarily interested
in freedom as a metaphysical problejn, however, but notes it
as generating a more significant tension, that which rises
out of the polarity of Courage (or self-affirmation) and anxiety -
It is at the point of this fifth polar structure that Tillich's
indebtedness to the depth psychology becomes evident. He
accepts the basic distinction between fear (as related to an
identifiable object) and anxiety as a reaction to finitude.
Thus anxiety is ontological38 so that "finite individualization
produces a dynamic tension with finite participation; the break
of their unity is a possibility . "39
Anxiety is, in part, the result of existential estrangement,
and is at this point closely tied in with the polarity of destiny
and freedom. Anxiety is, basically, the by-product of
creatureliness . It goes without saying, that Tillich here refers
to what the German means by Urangst , and not to neurotic
anxiety which may result from pathological inner conflicts.
To him, Urangst springs from confrontation with the threat of
nothingness. Tillich sees no adequate answer to anxiety, as
he defines it, in psychotherapy. 41 Cosmic anxiety cannot be
overcome; it must be accepted and put to creative use, in
terms ofwhat Tillich calls Courage. He goes beyond the usual
definition of this term (that is, "the power of the mind to over
come fear")42 and asserts that itmust be understood ontologi
cally in terms of a quality which can "conquer the anxiety of
meaninglessness and doubt. "43
In connection with the discussion of Courage and anxiety,
Tillich reveals his belief that the threat of nonbeing is a real
^^Ibid. , I, p. 183.
^^Ibid. , I, p. 182.
^'^ Ibid. , I, p. 185.
^^Ibid. , I, p. 191.
^^Tbid. , I, p. 199.
"^^Ibid. , n, pp. 62f.
"^^Ibid. , n, p. 173.
42 The Courage to Be , p.
^^Ibid. , p. 174.
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threat, so that man may exclude himself, not only from
relative (that is, finite) being, but from ultimate (or eternal)
existence. Thus, his anxiety has a foundation in real fact.
Tillich proposes, in place of a self-sufficient finitude, a
Courage which will turn anxiety into positive and constructive
purpose.
Courage, confronted by meaninglessness, calls for self-
affirmation; insofar as man can meet this condition, he can
rise above the uncreative forms of courage. Such self-
affirmation comes "in spite of" nonbeing, and leads to the
power-to -be. 44 it involves risk, to be sure; but in self-
affirmation, the individual so doing rises above the anxieties
of destiny and of meaninglessness. This leads to confidence;
and Tillich tries to equate this with justification as understood
by Luther. 45 This writer wonders, however, whether this
equation is allowable, in terms of the historic understanding
of the passage, "The just shall live by his faith. "
From the foregoing it is evident that while there is much in
Tillich's thought which one must appreciate, he is in major
areas of his thought far from the positions considered to be
essential by historic Christianity. He acknowledges the that
of human sinfulness, but is inadequate in his exposition of the
how . In his attitude toward Revelation, he seems to fail to
give to fallen man an adequate beacon light out of the dark.
He is acute in his analysis of natural man's response to his
position as alienated from God, but does not, at least by the
end of Volume II of his Systematic Theology , show us a
coherent program for reconciliation. The connection between
identification with "The New Being in Christ" and the empirical
Courage are far from clear . It may be that the appearance of
Volume III of his magnum opus will clarify some of these
issues. It is unlikely that they can rectify the situation at
many of the points at which he has already committed himself.
44/^/^. , p. 151.
Ihid. , pp. 163ff ,
